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COMMENTS
BANK RESPONSIBILITY TO THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT
AGAINST DEPOSITOR'S ACCOUNT
A bank may find itself in a very difficult situation upon receiving
notice from a third party that he claims a deposit in the bank is his
property and not the property of the person in whose name the
deposit stands. Some states1 have adopted a statute which provides
in substance that when a third party gives notice to a bank of an
adverse claim to a deposit, the bank does not have to recognize
such claim until it is directed to do so by proper court order or
unless a proper indemnity bond is furnished the bank. The rules
which obtain in the absence of such legislative enactment present a
surprisingly varied expression of law. This comment treats of decisions handed down in courts where the common law prevails.
A leading authority has set forth what might be termed the common
law rule governing the question in the following language :2
"A bank is justified in paying to the depositor or his order
until the fund is claimed by some other person; but, if notified
that the funds belong to another, it will pay the depositor at
its peril."
This statement of the rule tells the bank nothing concerning the
nature or extent of notice required to remove the peril involved
in not paying the depositor. The extensive liability to which a bank
may be subject for wrongful dishonor of a depositor's checks makes
it important for the bank to determine whether it has been "notified"
by the third party claimant sufficiently, so that dishonor of the depositor's checks will be rightful. Thus, the problem is largely one
of adequacy of notice, and it is here that disagreement is found
in the cases.
Attention must first be directed to the nature and extent of
the bank's liability for wrongful dishonor of the depositor's check.
Some courts assign a breach of contract as the basis of such liability,
while other courts base the bank's liability upon the tort of injury
to the depositor's credit and reputation, which is similar to slander
or libel.
In Thomas v. American Trust Co.,3 the depositor drew a check
for $3.00 and delivered it to the payee, who presented the check to
Paton's Digest of Legal Opinions (1940) Vol. II, lists the states which have
adopted such a statute as being Arkansas, California, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Utah, and West Virginia.
2 Morse on Banks (3d Ed.), sec. 342.
1
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the drawee bank, which refused to pay the check and marked it:
"No account in this name." The payee procured a criminal warrant
for the arrest of the depositor for issuing a "bad check." The depositor was found not guilty. The depositor then brought an action
against the bank to recover damages caused by the wrongful and
malicious refusal of the bank to pay a check. In its decision, the
court said, Connor, J., speaking:
"There was evidence at the trial of this action from which
the jury could find, as it did, that the refusal of the defendant
to pay the check, which was drawn by the plaintiff and duly
presented by the payee, was wrongful and unlawful. Such
refusal was a breach of the contract between the plaintiff and
the defendant with respect to plaintiff's deposit with the defendant. For such breach, the plaintiff was entitled to nominal
damages, at least."
In Schaffner v. Ehrman4 a bookkeeper of the bank, by mistake,
charged two checks of another depositor to the plaintiff's (appellee's)
account. By this mistake the depositor's balance was shown by the
bank's books to be $125 less than it was in fact. Some three weeks
later, the depositor drew a check on the bank for $249. The payee
presented this check, through the clearinghouse, and payment was
refused for want of funds. The depositor brought action against
the bank for refusing to pay checks drawn on it. Wilkin, J., in the
opinion of the court, said:
"***To return a check marked "Refused for want of funds"
to the holder, especially through a clearing-house, certainly
tends to bring the drawer of that check into disrepute as a
person engaged in mercantile business; and it needs no argument
to show that a single refusal of that kind might often, and
frequently does, bring ruin upon a business man;***
"***So here the bank wrongfully refused to pay the checks
of the appellee. That refusal was intentional, and without just
excuse. There was, therefore, all the elements of legal malice,
although there might have been no intention to injure the
appellee***."
If the depositor whose checks are dishonored is a merchant,
trader, or businessman he can recover substantial damages from the
bank, for wrongful refusal to honor his checks, without the necessity
of proving actual damages. In ruling on the case of McFall et al. v.
FirstNational Bank of Forest City,5 the court said:
"***Under the law, the only burden imposed upon appellants
was to show that they were merchants, that they had money
on deposit in appellee's bank in sufficient amount to cover checks
3 208 N.C. 653, 182 S.E. 136 (1935).
4 139 Ill. 109, 28 N.E. 917, 15 L.R.A. 134, 32 Am. St. Rep. 192 (1891).
5 138 Ark. 370, 211 S.W. 919, 4 A.L.R. 940 (1919).
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drawn by them, and that the bank refused payment of the
checks. The instructions as written imposed the additional
burden of requiring appellants to prove by competent evidence
the amount of damages sustained by them, if any, in excess
of nominal damages. The instructions practically eliminated
the presumption of substantial damages arising from the law in
favor of appellants on account of their being merchants at
the time appellee turned down their checks."
Attention is now directed to those cases where the bank's reason
for dishonor of a depositor's check is the known existence of a
third party claim. In such cases it appears that nothing short of a
judicial order obtained by the third party will constitute sufficient
"notice" to protect the bank from liability to the depositor. In the
case of Tassell v. Cooper,6 it was held that the bank had no right
to dishonor the depositor's (plaintiff's) checks, where the money in
the depositor's account had been paid to him by cheque under the
mistaken belief that he was still an agent, and that agency had in
fact been terminated and the depositor was no longer entitled to receive that money. The depositor's former principal had notified the
bank in writing that he claimed the deposit and would hold the bank
harmless in connection with his claTm. Judge Maule said, in part,
"The circumstances that the receipt of the cheque by the plaintiff
might have been blameable, does not afford any answer to the action."
In Lund v. Seamen's Bank7 an assignee of the depositor sued
the bank for funds on deposit in the bank to the credit of his assignor.
The bank set up as a defense that the depositor had received the
money on deposit by fraud. The court held that this was not a good
defense, and said:
"No principle of law can however be found which permits
a debtor for goods sold, or for money lent or deposited, to
set up, as a defense against a claim of his creditor, that
his title to the goods sold, or money lent or deposited, is
defective or wrongful. That question is of no concern to the
purchaser or borrower, unless the third party who claims to
have been despoiled of his goods or money will proceed, by
process of law, to enforce his rights."
Finally there are the cases wherein the bank has continued to
honor the depositor's checks, after some notice of a third party
claim, and has been sued by the third party claimant. These cases
usually result in exoneration of the bank from liability because of
insufficiency of the notice. This prompts the question as to whether
anything short of an actual court order attaching the account will
ever be adequate notice to justify the -bank in dishonoring the de69 Common Bench Reports 509 (England 1850).

737 Barb., N.Y., 129 (1862).
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positor's checks. However, by way of dicta, these cases do indicate
conflicting tests of notice which fall short of the court order requirement, and reference is sometimes made to a duty to hold up
payment of the depositor's checks until the third party claimant has
had a reasonable opportunity to institute legal proceedings to obtain
a court order. For instance, in the case of Drumm-Flato Commission
Co. v. Gerlach Bank,8 the court said:
"***Any one claiming money deposited in a bank to the
credit of another ought to be required to exercise the same
diligence in taking legal steps to assert his claim thereto that
a reasonably prudent and diligent person would exercise in
attaching the property of his debtor when satisfied that such
debtor is about to make a fraudulent disposition of his property,
or to remove the same from the state.***"
In Huff v. Oklahoma State Bank,9 the court cited the DrummFlato Commission Co. v. Gerlach case, supra, and said:
"The evidence in the case disclosed the bank held the money
for nine days after receiving the notice of the plaintiff. Whether
this was a reasonable time was a question for the jury, and
there was no error in overruling the motion to instruct a verdict
for plaintiff."
In GibralterRealty Corporationv. Mount Vernon Trust Company,"
the plaintiff, an assignee of the deposit of a depositor in the defendant
trust company, sued to recover the amount of the deposit. The bank
had been closed during the bank holiday and on March 24, 1933,
it was opened on a restricted basis with the privilege of paying out
10 per cent of the deposits. On March 25, 1933, the depositor had
on deposit in the bank $1,285.41. On that date she purchased some
real estate from the plaintiff for $1,000, paying $128, the 10 per cent
she was allowed to withdraw from the bank, and assigned to the
plaintiff the balance of the deposit. On April 4, 1933, plaintiff wrote
to the bank and stated that the depositor's account had been assigned
to it. The bank did nothing about this letter until about nine months
later, when it wrote and acknowledged the letter but said it would
not recognize the assignment because of a prior charge against the
account. This. charge was dated October 9, 1933, was for the amount
of $375, and had been authorized by the depositor as payment for
thirty shares of stock in the defendant bank. By a reorganization arrangement of May 23, 1933, depositors had become entitled to 55 per
cent in cash. The realty company contended that the bank, after it
received the notice, should have held the money for it as assignee.
S 107 Mo. App. 426, 81 S.W. 503 (1904).

9 87 Okl. 7, 207 P. 963 (1922).
10 276 N.Y. 353, 12 N.E. (2d) 438 (1938).
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The court, by a four to three decision, reversed the lower courts,
and dismissed the complaint, saying:
"Under the peculiar relation existing between a bank and
its customers, we think the bank was not called upon to honor
the assignment in this case. When the depositor presented her
check the bank was in no position to question her title to the
funds. That title may be questioned by one holding a better
title, but the bank cannot assert that party's right. It was bound
to carry out its part of its contract to honor the depositor's
checks up to the amount of the deposit, until it had notice
sufficient to show that the depositor had put the title to the
funds out of her hands. The notice here was merely a statement
by the assignee that it held an assignment of the funds. The
bank could not, by reason of such notice, be convinced that
it was no longer liable to the original depositor. It could not,
by the production of this letter, establish affirmatively that
some one else had a better right. There was not placed in its
hands the means of defense against the depositor. The case
would be different if the assignment itself, bearing the signature of the depositor, had been filed with the bank. Anything
less than that is not sufficient notice.
"***All that respondent had to do was to present the original
assignment to the bank so that the bank could ascertain from
the original signature that it was that of its depositor. That
it failed to do, and because of such failure it should not be
permitted to shift its loss onto the bank.""'
The latest of this line of cases is that of Gencdler v. Sibley State
Bank.12 Here, the depositor was engaged in the business of buying
and selling wool. He bought wool from producers in Iowa and sold
it to the plaintiff, who stored the wool in a warehouse in Faribault,
Minnesota. The depositor made several shipments of wool amounting, in all, to some 31,600 pounds. He was not paid cash for this
wool because, under regulations then in effect, it could not be sold
until after it had been graded and appraised by Government apprais"1In its decision

the court made no reference to a statute in effect in New

York, viz. Consol. Laws, Banking Law, Chap. 3 see. 134, sub. 5:

"Notice to any bank or trust company of an adverse claim to a
deposit standing on its books to the credit of any person shall not be
effective to cause said bank or trust company to recognize said adverse
claimant unless such adverse claimant shall also either procure a restraining order, injunction or other appropriate process against said bank

or trust company from a court of competent jurisdiction in a cause
therein instituted by him wherein the person to whose credit the deposit
stands or his executor or administrator is made a party and served with
summons, or shall execute to such bank or trust company, in form and
with sureties acceptable to it a bond, indemnifying said bank or trust
company from any and all liability, loss, damage, costs and expenses,

for and on account of the payment of such adverse claim or the dishonor of the check or other order of the person to whose credit the

12

deposit stands on the books of said bank or trust company."
62 F. Supp. 805 (D.C.,. Iowa, 1945).
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ers. He was, however, issued several warehouse receipts which,
added together, accounted for all the wool he had shipped. In order
to raise money with which to pay the producers, the depositor borrowed money from the defendant bank, using the warehouse receipts
as collateral security therefor. The plaintiff was informed of this
use of the warehouse receipts.
On July 6, 1943, the plaintiff caused a draft in the amount of
$7,106 to be issued to the bank as payee, in partial payment of wool
which had up to that time been graded and appraised. This draft
was deposited in the checking account of the depositor, who used
a major portion of the value of the draft in paying some of his notes
held by the bank. On September 28, 1943, the plaintiff's attorney-infact sent a personal check in the amount of $12,775.88 payable jointly
to the depositor and the bank. In a letter accompanying the check
he stated that it was in settlement of the wool sold by the depositor.
However, in calculating the amount due the depositor, he had neglected
to take into account the draft for $7,106. When the check was received it was properly indorsed and deposited in the checking account
of the depositor, who immediately drew a check in the amount of
$2,044, payable to the bank, in full payment of his debt, with interest,
to the bank.
On November 17, 1943, the plaintiff's attorney-in-fact discovered
the overpayment and telephoned the bank to notify it of the overpayment and to inform the bank that the plaintiff expected the overpayment to be refunded. The bank immediately called the depositor, who,
at the bank's request, drew a check in the amount of $1,100 (the balance
of his account at that time was $1,155.04) payable to the bank, for
which the bank issued a cashier's check in the amount of $1,100 payable to the depositor. The bank held this cashier's check pending
developments.
The depositor, through his attorneys, made demand on the bank
for the $1,100. The attorney for the bank advised the bank that it
could not legally withhold the $1,100 from its depositor. The bank
then turned the cashier's check over to the depositor, but the record
is not clear as to just when this was done. The cashier of the bank
testified that it was "quite a while afterwards", and also that it
was "a few days after November 17, 1943." From entries in the
bank's ledger sheets, concerning deposits and withdrawals on checks,
it appeared that the cashier's check was handed to the depositor on
November 23, 1943, or six days after the bank had received the
telephone notice from the plaintiff of the overpayment to the depositor
and the demand for refund.
The plaintiff did nothing further in the matter until October 14,
1944, nearly eleven months after discovering the overpayment, when
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he brought action against the bank and the depositor for the overpayment of $7,106. The depositor defaulted in the action.
The court had no difficulty in finding no liability of the bank
before it had notice of the overpayment since, to be chargeable with
liability for receiving a deposit of money belonging to another person, a bank must be in conspiracy with the depositor or actually
know of wrongdoing, and mere means of knowledge is not sufficient.
In ruling on the liability of the bank for its acts after it received
notice from the plaintiff that an overpayment had been made and
that plaintiff was claiming the $1,100 in the account of the depositor,
the court said:
"The liability of a bank to an adverse claimant to a deposit
standing in the name of another is clearly not based upon contract for the bank's contractual relations are with its depositor
and not with such third party. Therefore, it seems clear that
the liability of a bank to such third party must be based on
tort.***
"***the burden would be upon the plaintiff as to the $1,100
deposit to establish that the Sibley Bank was under a duty
to the plaintiff in regard thereto, and that the Bank breached
that duty, and that the breach of that duty was the proximate
cause of the loss to the plaintiff of the $1,100. The plaintiff
proved notice to the Bank of its adverse claim. Such notice
gave rise to the duty on the part of the Bank to withhold payment from Sanders for such length of time that the plaintiff
by proceeding diligently and promptly in its institution of a suit
could have tied up the deposit by court order or process.
The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that it was diligently
and promptly so proceeding with the institution of legal proceedings to tie up the deposit by court order or process when
the Bank made an unreasonably early release of the deposit,
and that as a proximate cause of such early release that the
plaintiff was unable to tie up the deposit by legal proceedings
and thereby lost the deposit."
Judgment was entered against the depositor, and in favor of the
bank as to the claim of the plaintiff against it.
A very general review of the cases indicates one truth threading
itself through each of them, discernible with varying degrees of
clarity, to the effect that a bank's primary duty is to its depositor,
and this is true whether the relationship between the two is considered
as based on contract, as debtor and creditor, as that peculiar relationship which exists between a bank and its depositor, or as one individual and another as viewed by the tort law. The courts of the various
states differ in their decisions as to just what a third party claimant
must do to establish his claim to a deposit in the bank as superior to the
claim of him in whose name the deposit stands. In Huff v. Oklahoma
State Bank, supra, failure of the third party claimant to institute
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court proceedings within nine days prevented his establishing that
superiority as a matter of law. The case of Drumm-Flato Commission
Co. v. Gerlach Bank, supra, required the third party claimant to exercise the same diligence in taking legal steps to assert his claim that
a reasonably prudent and diligent person would exercise in attaching the property of his debtor when satisfied that such debtor is
about to make a fraudulent disposition of his property. The Gibralter
Realty Corp. v. Mount Vernon Trust Co. case, supra, required the

third party claimant to do nothing more than place the depositor's
assignment, bearing the depositor's signature, into the hands of the
bank. The third party claimant failed to establish the superiority of his claim in Gendler v. Sibley State Bank, supra, through

failing to bring the necessary suit within six days.
It appears that the "notice" under which a bank makes payment
to the depositor "at its peril" must be sufficient to furnish the bank
with a legal defense against the depositor's suit for wrongful dishonor.
Certainly a restraining order or injunction furnishes such a defense,
and, so far as the actual holdings in the cases are concerned, the
bank may continue to pay the depositor's checks until this defense
is furnished.
However, in the absence of such an order, the dicta in the cases
place the bank in a real position of peril. A written assignment filed
with the bank gives it a legal defense according to the dictum in
one jurisdiction. The precarious position of the bank is further complicated by the duty, imposed by dicta in other jurisdictions, to hold
up payment of depositor's checks until the third party claimant has
had reasonable time in which to institute court proceedings. Since
the reasonableness of this time will be a jury question in a suit
either by the depositor or the third party claimant, the receipt by
a bank of "notice" of a third party claim other than by an appropriate
judicial process will require the bank to make a very difficult decision.
JOSEPn A. BETHEL

